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HAD  I  HAD  THE  PLEASURE  OF  ADDRESSING 
. THIS  CONFERENCE  TEN  YEARS  AGOJ  AT  THE  START 
OF  THE  7Q'sJ  I  SUSPECT  THAT  MY  REMARKS  WOULD 
HAVE  BEEN  ALONG  THE  FOLLOWING  LINES,  THAT  IN 
EUROPE  FOR  THE  COMING  DECADE  WE  WERE  LOOKING 
>-'- AHEAD  TO  A·  FAIRLY  ROSY  FUTURE,  ~RITAIN~: 
IRELAND  AND  DENMARK  WERE  ON  THE  VERGE  OF 
JOINING  THE  COMMUNITY  WITH  ALL  THE  ADDED 
POLITICAL  WEIGHT  THAT  THAt  WOULD  GIVE  US, 
OUR  ECONOMIES  LOOKED  SET  TO  EXPAND  AT  THE 
RATES  OF  GROWTH  WE  HAD  ENJOYED  IN  THE  PRECEDING 
DECADE  OF  THE  60'S,  !•!I THIN  THE  CoMt1UNITY J 
WE  SAW  A FAIRLY  STRAIGHTFORWARD  DEVELOPMENT 
TOWARD  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION, 
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As  WE  NOW  KNOWJ  SUCH  A ROSY  PICTURE 
WAS  NOT  TO  CORRESPOND  WITH  THE  FUTURE  AS  IT 
IN  FACT  UNfOLOE.D...  THE  OIL  PRICE  _SHOCKS1 
. THE  DISAPPEARANCE  OF  ANY  REAL  INTERNATIONAL 
LOW  GROWTH  AND  WORSE~ING UNEMPLOYMENT,  ALL 
MADE  THE  70's A DECADE  OF  DISAPPOINTMENTSJ 
IF  NOT  EVEN  OF  DESPAIR; 
~ 
ALL  OF  WHICH  DE~10rfSTRATES THE  RISKS 
INHERENT  IN  TRYING  TO  PROPHESY  THE  FUTUREiOF 
THE  80's  AND  WHAT  OUR  RELATIONS  MAY  BE  lN:THE 
COMING  DECADE. 
WHAT  ONE  CAN  HOWEVER  DO  MORE  EASILY 
IS  TO  RETRACE  "tHE  HISTORY  OF  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  •.. 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  CoMMUNITY;  TO  ASSESS 
'I 
HOW  THEY  STAND  AT  PRESENT,  AND  THEN  TRY  AND 
GIVE  SOME  FORECAST  OF  HOW  THEY  MIGHT  DEVELOP 
.- IN  THE  NEXT  I  I  I 
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IN  THE  NEXT  YEAR  OR  SOJ  GIVEN  THE  KIND  OF 
POLICIES  CURRENTLY  BEING  PURSUED  ON  BOTH 
SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC. 
fROM  THE  EARLIEST  DAYS  OF  ITS  CREATION  . \.  ·\:. 
,  ... ·:···.:·  .. 
IN  THE  U.S.  INTERESTi  INDEED  IN  THE  INTEREST 
OF  THE  WEST  AS  A WHOLE.  f#~~~~~'lg;~~~~~~t~#.-i'~,&~~~~~~ 
PROBLEMS  AROSEJ  HOWEVERJ  ONCE  .SOME  OF 
THE  PRACTICAL  CONSEQUENCES  OF  OUR  BEING  A 
COMMON  MARKET  BEGAN  TO  IMPINGE  ON  u:s:  ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS.  WE  HAD  TAKEN  THE  ECONOMIC  ROAD  TO 
SOME  FORM  OF  POLITICAL  UNION,  THIS  MEANT  THAT 
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·THE  UNITED  StAYEs  \~AS  HAVING  TO  DEAL  \'liTH  A 
NEW  COMMERCIAL  PARTNERJ  SOMEWHAT  DIFFERENT  · 
AND  EVEN  SOMEWHAT  GREATER  THAN  THE  ~:.~~:.f:>::J.;,::~::·~;;·:;:~:;~-{~~:;;·.7~.-.~  ~-;;{;~.:;;:~;_.::~-;j.;~,::::::.~-:·~:--~  ..  ~"·.:.-~~.:~.·.:~-~ ::_.-..  ~ :.-.; ...  ~-~-:. 
SUM  OF  ITS  PARTS;  A NEW  COMMERCIA(  PARTNERJ 
~10REOVERJ 
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MOREOVER,  WHOSE  COMMON  POLICIES  WERE 
DIFFERENT  FROM  THE  EARLIER  NATIONAL  POLICIES 
AND  WHICH  THUS  TOOK  SOME  GETTING  USED  TO. 
AND,  ALTHOUGH  THE  UNITED  STATES  HAD  ASSISTED 
~ 
AT  THF  BIRTH  OF  THE  COMMUNITY,  IT  WAS  NOT 
ITS  PARENT~ .  NOR  EVEN  AN  OlDER  SIBLING. 
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So  IN  THE  SIXTIES  AND  EARLY  SEVENTIES  f:<~~:i4:::~'.·.~:~~~;~~.~:/~.:.;.:L~,-~c~:2;::2/;;;.JL.:::=;-::. :·:·--
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~'IE  HAD  THE  PHENOMENON  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
CONSTANTLY  REAFFIRMING  POLITICAL  SUPPORT  FOR 
THE  GOALS  AND  IDEALS  OF  THE  COI"ifVIUNITY'Jvi:-{ILC.  ;.:,-
THE  SAME  TIME  SUFFERING  PERIODIC  IRRITATION 
AT  THE  REAL  OR  IMAGINED  EFFECTS  OF 
COMMUNITY  POLICY.  THERE  WAS  THE  FAMOUS 
CHICKEN  WAR  OF  THAT  ERA,  THE  U.S~ SOYBEAN 
EMBARGO,  RECURRENT  AGGRAVATION  OVER  STEEL 
IMPORTS  AND  U.S.  CONCERN  OVER  OUR  PREFERENTIAL 
TRADE  AGREEMENTS. 
NOT  ONLY  DID  I  I  I 
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NoT  ONLY  DID  THESE  DISPUTES  MATTER 
IN  THEMSELVES  FOR  THE  ECONOMIC  DAMAGE  THEY~ 
COULD  AND  DID  CAUSEJ  BUT  THEY  ALSO 
THREATENED  TO  UNDERMINE  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF 
A HEALTHY  POLITICAL  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  COMMUNITY. 
FoRTUNATELYJ  WE  LEARNT  OUR  LESSON 
BEFORE  IT  WAS  TOO  LATE  AND  ESTABLISHED  AND 
USED  MECHANISMS  THROUGH  WHICH  WE  TRIED  TO 
~ 
AVOID  ANY  DAMAGING  CONFLI£T, 
THERE  HAVE  BEEN  THE  SUCCESSIVE 
ROUNDS  OF  MULTILATERAL  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS; 
DISCUSSIONS  IN  THE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  GATT 
AND  OECD;  THE  TWICE  YEARLY  CONSULTATIONS 
BETWEEN  HIGH-~VEL OFFICIALS  FROM  EACH  SIDE; 
DAY-TO-DAY  DEALINGS  THROUGH  OUR  PERMANENT 
DELEGATIONS  IN  ONE  ANOTHER'S  CAPITALS  ANDJ 
THE  ESTABLISHMENT.  I  I 
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THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  CLOSE  PERSONAL  RELATIONS 
BETWEEN  TRADE  OFFICIALS  ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE 
ATLANTIC, 
-
NONE  OF  THIS  MEANSJ  HOWEVER 1  THAT  WE 
ARE  NOT  STILL  PLAGUED  BY  THE  KIND  OF  COMMERCIAL 
PROBLEMS  THAT  WERE  WITH  US  BEFORE.  THE  DIF-
FERENCE  IS  THAT  WE  NOW  HAVE  A VARIETY  OF 
MECHANISMS  OR  FORA  THROUGH  WHICH  TO  DEAL 
WITH  THEM. 
THE  PROBLEM~  HOWEVER~  IS  THAT  WHILE  WE 
HAVE  ALL  THESE  MECHANISMS~  THE  SCALE  AND 
DIMENSION  OF  POTENTIAL  COMMERCIAL  CONFLrCTS 
HAS  INCREASED.  THIS  I~  PARTLY  BECAUSE  OUR 
TRADE  WITH  ONE  ANOTHER  HAS  EXPANDED  SO  FAST 
-AND  REACHED  ~UC-H  AN  ENORMOUS  VOLUME~  THAT  ANY 
HICCUP  BECOMES  OF  IMPORTANCE, 
IN  ADDITION~  WE  BOTH  FACE  A MAJOR 
PROBLEM  IN  THE  SHAPE  OF  THE  HUGE  DEFICITS 
THAT  WE  EACH,  ,:_~ 
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THAT  WE  EACH  HAVE  WITH  OPEC. 
THIS  MEANS  THAT  THE  FIRST  AREA  OF 
POTENTIAL  CONFLICT  BETWEEN  US  LIES  IN  THE 
TEMPTATION  THAT  EXISTS  TO  PURSUE  ~BEGGAR 
THEY  NEIGHBOUR'  POLICIES  AGAINST  ONE  ANOTHER 
IN  A MISGUIDED  ATTEMPT  TO  OFFSET  THE  COSTS 
OF  IMPORTING  OUR  OIL, 
FOR  EXAMPLE)  WITH  THE  EXCEPTION 
OF  JAPAN)  ALL  MAJOR  INDUSTRIALISED  COUNTRIES 
HAVE  IN  RECENT  YEARS  BEEN  RUNNING  SUBSTANTIAL 
TRADE  DEFICITS. 
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THE  COMMUNITY'S  TRADE  DEFICIT  WITH 
THE  UNITED  STATES  HASJ  IN  JUST  ONE  YEARJ 
ALMOST  DOUBLED  TO  AROUND  $20  BILLION,  COMPARE 
THIS  WITH  THE  U,S,  DEFICIT  OF  $10  BILLION 
~ 
WITH  JAPANJ  AND  YOU  BEGIN  TO  GET  SOME  IDEA 
OF  THE  CONCERN  THIS  MAY  BE  CAUSING,  NOT-THAT 
WE  CONSIDER  A DEFICIT  PER  SE  TO  BE  A BAD 
THING  IN  OUR  TRADE  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
BUT  THE  RATE  AT  WHICH  IT  HAS  INCREASEDJ 
AND  PERHAPS  MAY  CONTINUE  TO  DO  SOJ  CANNOT  BE 
TAKEN  LIGHTLY I 
THERE  IS  ALSO  THE  FACT  THAT  THE 
COMMUNITY'S  WO~SENING DEFICIT  BOTH  WITH  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  REST  OF  THE  WORLD  IS 
PILING  AGAINST  A BACKGROUND  OF  DECLINING 
ECONOMIC  GRO~TH AND  RISING  UNEMPLOYMENT, 
IN  SUCH  CIRCUMSTANCES  I  I  ! 
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IN  SUCH  CIRCUMSTANCES~  DISPLACED  WORKERS  AND 
HARD-PRESSED  BUSINESSES  ARE  QUICK  TO  BLAME 
FOREIGN  COMPETITION  FOR  THEIR  WOES.  DEMANDS 
FOR  PROTECTIONISM  BECOME  LOUD~  INSISTENT  AND 
IMPOSSIBLE  TO  IGNORE, 
THE  DEMANDS  FOR  PROTECTION  ARE  EXPRESSED 
WITH  PARTICULAR  FORCE~  IN  THOSE  SECTORS  WHERE 
A TRADE  PROBLEM  HAS  BEE.N  APPARENTLY  BEEN  SOLVED 
BUT  WHERE  THE  SITUATION  HAS  PROVED-TO  BE  UN-
SATISFACTORY,  ·THE  CLASS!~ EXAMPLE  AT  PRESENT  --
IS  IN  THE  CASE  OF  STEEL.  FOR  A VARIETY  OF 
-~-"'· ·--
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TO  THE  SO-CALLED  TRIGGER-PRICE  MECHANISMJ  THERE 
HAS  BEEN  A DRAMATIC  FALL  IN  COMMUNITY  EXPORTS  OF 
STEEL  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES,  FROM  7.4  MILLION 
TONS  IN  1978  TO  5.4  MILLION  TONS  IN  1979J  AND 
FROM  THERE  TO  ~:.5 MILLION  TONS  IN  1980.  WE  MAY 
HAVE  BOUGHT  PEACE  THROUGH  THE  EFFECTIVE  USE  OF 
THE  MECHANISM  I  MENTIONED  EARLIER:  BUT  FOR  US 
IN  EUROPE  PEACE  HAS  BEEN  BOUGHT  AT  QUITE  A HIGH 
PRICE, 
·- r~·.  t. 
L  LASTLY  I  I  I 
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-:._··.'  .. 
.  · ..........  ··  .·-....... . 
.. ...  '} . . 
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LASTLY~ 
THERE  IS  THE  QUESTION  OF  JAPAN.  EACH  OF  US 
< 
HAS  AN  ALMOST  IDENTICAL  PROBLEM  IN  TRADE 
WITH  JAPAN.  THE  U.S.  DEFICIT  WITH  JAPAN  IS 
IN  THE  ORDER  OF  $1Q  BILLION,  THAT  OF  THE 
COMMUNITY  IS  OF  AROUND  THE  SAME  MAGNITUDE. 
THE  PRODUCTS  THAT  THE  JAPANESE  SELL  ON  THE 
U, S.  MARKET  WITH  GREATEST  SUCCESS  ·ARE  THE  SM·1E 
AS  THOSE  NOW  CLAIMING  AN  jVEN  GREATER  SHARE 
OF  THE  EuROPEAN  MARKET.  AUTOMOBILES~  TV  SETS) 
ELECTRONIC  PRODUCTS)  MACHINE  TOOLS:  All 
THE  PRODUCTS  OF  INDUSTRIES  IN  WHICH  ~O~H 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  EUROPE  HAVE  IMMENSE 
INVESTMENTS  OF  BOTH  CAPITAL  AND  LABOUR. 
THIS  IS  NOT  THEREFORE  A MATTER_  THAT 
CAN  BE  DEALT  WITH  EITHER  SIMPLY  BETWEEN 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN  OR  BETWEEN 
.  . .  .  -·,  ....... ··:: .. ·.· ..  -.. ~-- -...  -·- .· . ·-·- .. .  .  ..  .  ..  -,  ~  ---~ .. 
?. · .... ---
~:':::"':  ........... -----~--~--
:_·; .. ,  .. ·:  .........  _;.·_~-~-: .. ··.  ~- ..  ....  ......  -





·:.·_  . .....  . 
'  ··-
'•'•.,c  --: 
.  · .. _:  ,.  ·,  .  __  :.-
···>-·  ... :  ;·-.  ·  ... ·· 
OURSELVES  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  AND  JAPAN,  ~#.ili~~(~:t~:;!=:!'f~~,~~~~ 
ANY  ACTION  I  I.  - ('  •·.  t.  ---r----- -:::-:=:  ..  ~ 
. r.·-.......... .  ,  ... 
·-...····:.  ...  --··  _._,  . 
·  .• \\,:C 
•·  -·  ,J 
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ANY  ACTION  THAT  ONE  OF  US  TAKES  IS  BOUND  TO 
HAVE  AN  EFFECT  ON  THE  OTHER  AND  THE  EFFECT 
IS  LIKELY  TO  BE  AN  ESCALATING  ONE, 
IF~  FOR  EXAMPLE~  THE  UNITED  STATES 
WERE  TO  TAKE  ACJION  TO  RESTRICT  JAPANESE  CAR 
IMPORTS~  THE  FIRST  EFFECT  ON  US  WOULD  BE 
THAT  THE  JAPANESE  WOULD  INTENSIFY  THEIR  EFFORTS 
ON  THE  EUROPEAN  MARKET. 
OUR  OWN  INDUSTRY~  SEEKING  RELIEF  FROM 
THIS  ADDED  PRESSURE  AND  CITING  THE  ACTION  OF 
THE  U.S.  GOVERNMENT~  WOULD  DEf>iAND  SIMILAR 
PROTECTION.  THEIR  ARGUMENTS  WOULD  BE  HARD 
TO  REFUTE, 
SECTORS~  SAY  FOR  EXAMPLE  TEXTILESJ  WOULD  SAY 
THAT  WHAT  WE  HAVE  DONE  FOR  AUTOMOBILES  WE 
MUST  NOW  DO  FOR  THEM. 
BuT  THE  IMPORTS .. , 
L 
"w.'  .. 
-··-J·  '•• 
- ' . 
·  .. 
.  .  ·-~ .;: ., . . 
_.··  -··  _: 
....  -··  .  - -:··  .  ..  .·  .  .  .  .  .  .  -····c --- ··:•·  -- .. ::/--
··-.  .  - -- ----~--- .. --------------------------
=~~o-~ '~C":~:-~c-_ :z 
..  -- .-..:_  .. 
-------------- .. --- ---- -- .. --- - ------- ----·  •..  -----··  --
~%?~~~1~t¥4:~~"?~;;J;,'£i;.),~~-~~ 
·<· ...  _ .. - ......  .-.:_.  -~-- ·.  --- .. -.... .  . .. ·-·- ~-- : 
'-'::_.:  __ . 
- .·-..  .:_  ..  ,  ·,_ 
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BUT  THE  IMPORTS  THAT  THEY  WOULD  WANT 
STOPPED  MIGHT  NOT  BE  COMING  FROM  JAPAN  BUT 
FROM  THE  UNITED  STATES. 
..  '  .  .':  ~. 
-~ . ·,  -:.·.::~.:''  .,  .  .-~:.·;-·:----·· ..  .:..: ...  _:.~.:-.:~  ·  ...  _·~--- ·  .... 
:~~-=-·-·\.  .  ...  ~~ 
~::"';-:·:::  ....  ·-..  .  ~-
.  ---:~·  ··.  '.  " .. ,  . 
.  ~:,_.:; ...  : . .  ·' .  '·  .  . .. . .  .. .  . ...  · 
THE  PROBLEM)  THEREFORE)  IS  A TRIANGULAR  t,S:..~::::·,:.;,;  .• ;:::·::.;:;/;;;  ':  ··.::.::.'  .· . .  ·--::  - ~. 
ONE,  IF  IT  IS  TO  BE  SOLVED  WITH  THE  MINIMUM 
\·;~.:·  '>~':'·  ~:~:·:.~·~  ~;:;,:.<:-:_,_~~~~.::'-:,,~:·~:,  .. :  :.'-. ~~::  ··:'·· ~.=::-::-=.. ·-.. 
.- .. <:  ..  .  ···.·.  .  .......  ~ ~ .. 
OF  DAMAGE  TO  ALL  CONCERNED)  IT  MUST  BE 
APPROACHED  AS  SUCH.  THE  THREE  OF  US  TOGETHER 
HAVE  TO  LOOK  AT  WAYS  OF  SOLVING  IT,  ·WE  ALL 
HAVE  TO  BE  ON  THE  SAME  TRACK,  AT  THE  SAME  TIME, 
~,r,.::.;~-~  ....  - ...  ~-~-•  ...,~-- ...  ~\--··-.. ~-.. -·:  .......  _ .......  -·····"""····-·-·  ••. 
THOSS  THEN  A~E THE  MAIN  AND  MOST 
PRESSING  PROBLEMS  IN  THE  TRADE  FIELD  - THE 
·,··  .. 
EFFECTS  OF  THE  0 I L DEF I CI TSJ.  THE  E·,· C.·' S  MOUNTING  " 
DEFICITS)  ACCOMPANIED  BY  A DETERIORATING 
•' 
ECONOMIC  SITLJ:AT.ION;  AN  UNSATISFACTORY  POSITION.,. 
FOR  OUR  STEEL  EXPORTS 
- ('-''t, 
AND  THE  U,S.-E.C, 
"'  "•.'  r 
:-. :·.- . 
. ,  .· ..  · 
. . . : .  .  . . . 
.,·-. 
..  _::  ·. 
·  .. :·.-: 
.  ·,. 
. '  :."• 
..  ...  ~) . .  . 
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AND  THE  U.S.  - E.C.-JAPANESE  TRIANGLE. 
LOOKING  TO  OUR  WIDER  ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSJ  WE  ARE  IMMEDIATELY  CONFRONTED  BY 
THE  POSSIBLE  EFFECTS  ON  OUR.  OWN  ECONOMY  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES'  ECONOMIC  PROGRAMME,  ITS 
-~.~ ....  ·~-- . ..  .  ~  ..  --.--· ...  _.  -- -··  ··--·'"--~---·-·· --- -···:- :  ·------. 
. .  .  -~: ...  .  '· 
'·  ...  __ -i.: ......  .-.. .:..·  .. ·  '•-!c''·~-~:· :."";;.--.'~-.. .::  •• -._., ..  •- _-........  ~:..:  ....... ~~:  -~~-~-•• .._--:  ... .;.,:_-.,_:_._ --- --~--
- .  \ 
..  - -~--- -- .-.  ---.-----:.:::.  ~  -:-: ...  --·  . 
AIMS  ARE  LAUDABLE. 
--- ... :  ·:·-;~--~-:-~ ·.,_ 
WE  ARE  THE  FIRST  TO  RECOGNISE. 
THAT  IF  THE  UNITED  STATES  CAN  REDUCE  ITS 
INFLATION  RATE  THEN  THAT  WILL  HELP  BRING  DOWN 
OURS,  JUST  AS  READILYJ  WE  RECOGNISE  THAT 
· INFLATION-FREE  GROWTH  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
WILL  HELP  SPUR  OUR  CURRENTLY  SLUGGISH  ECONOMIES. 
WE  ARE  READY  TO  ACCEPTJ  FOR  A PERIODJ  CONTINUING 
HIGH  INTEREST  RATES  AND  EVEN  NEGATIVE  GROWTHJ 
IF  THAT  IS  THE  PRICE  OF  SUCCESSJ  BUT  ONLYJ 
I  WOULD  EMPHASISEJ  IF  THE  POLICY  DOES  SUCCEED,. 
--:·  .-
IN  A SENSEJ  WE  ARE  NO  DIFFERENT  FROM 
THE  AMERICAN  ELECTORATE,  WE  ARE  READY  FOR 
SOME  SACRIFICES  BUT  WE  ARE  EXPECTING  SOME 
RESULTS,  THE  ONLY  DIFFERENCE  -OF  COURSE  IS 
THAT  WE  DON'T  GEJ  I  I  I 
....  I. t,_  l 
. .- ;' .:'..  ."': ..  :  ..  ·,· ..  -~--- -......  --_ .. -.. ;_·._.-_ ----:  :-· 
~:::, .. :.::.2::·::<.-t;,  ... ,cO .....  ,·.::;_~:;,  ..  :~~:·;:~-:-~-i.~-~;~~~:-/;,:.-;~~;_~i;..-~~.~;~~J~-~.;._:...:.;.:..~-~:::::.~:.-. 
··  .. ·:.:.·;~~~~~~4-"~~~~~~f-
_.;,-
:·: ·- ··."  -~ :  .  .'  ;.' .._.  : .. ·-: .  ;  ."·:::  ....  :.~.  . 
·..  ~. ~---~ ..  . 
~-~---·-..  .-~  ~-··  '  ...  · 
~  .  . 
~~- :·.-,~:·,_.. ~'  ~~--·  ·,. ·.· .. ·., ·.- -~r.·~~.  --~~ .-: . '.  ·~ ~:·~--~-~~-~~-- ~- ._·  ~---~  .  ~ ~- ~., 
,.··  :'·y····,>  :  ~~~:--:,:;.·; __  ..  •  ....  ·.-· ... 
.  . ... 
. . .  :_  ·,-~· 
_., __ .  -.. 
·'·····  ·.--·--· 
·. ·'-
\  . 
\. 
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THAT  WE  DON'T  GET  TO  VOTE, 
WHILE  WE  ARE  PREPARED  TO  GIVE  THE 
POLICY  EVERY  CHANCE  OF  SUCCESSJ  IT  DOES  NOT 
FOLLOW  THAT  WE  ARE  NECESSARILY  PREPAREDJ  OR 
FEEL  OBLIGEDJ  TO  EMBARK  ON  AN  IDENTICAL  POLICY 
OURSELVES. 
.·  ·.  ·.··  . .  -.... :  -·.:-- . ·,··.-· ...  ·  ..  , .·. ··. ·  .. ·.-.. 
' \ 
. \: 
.··' . .  ·. · ...  :  . .  - .. · .·~ .·.  :::-..  ·,  .•.  -:::-~ :..~·-.  ·.:\~: ::--
';z-:I-~~~;,j;;::;:::  f::~;-:-_:'': 
.._..,_: ... -.:._.-· ......  _.,,-~-..  :  ......  :~-:·-·--:..:.  :.. ....  -...... -::.·--.. ··- ..  _: 
f)~i~;;_~i;:iL0~~-~~~:i:Si~~2~;.Qid:-k~ii.:~:,i:J.~:;.~!.;;;~:.:/;;d.8*~-!~-
.  ···-.  ---··.··--·--_  ·-------~---~:--·- .... 
OUR  ECONOMIC  POLICIES  MAY  BE  INFLUENCED_  ,.  .. 
BY  WHAT  IS  HAPPENING  IN  AMERICA  AND  ELSEWHERE1 
~ 
BUT  THEY  MUST  FINALLY  BE  ARRIVED  AT  IN  THE 
CONTEXT  OF  OUR  OWN  SOCIAL1  INDUSTRIAL  AND 
POLITICAL  ENVIRONMENT, 
THE  CONSENSUS  THAT  APPARENTLY  EXISTS 
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  FOR  CUTTING  PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE  hS  NOT  SO  EASILY  ARRIVED  AT  IN  .. 
EUROPE,  THAT1  WHETHER  WE  LIKE  IT  OR  NQT 1  IS 
";:·-
·-
A FACT  OF  LIFE  THAT  CANNOT  BE  CHANGED  OVERNIGHT, 
THE  REMARKABLE  THING-ABOUT  THE  CURRENT 
ECONOMIC  . It 
r'  •·. 
~ 
'' ..  J' 
.  ·  ..  ·· .. 
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ECONOMIC  CRISIS  IN  EUROPE  IS  THE  RELATIVELY 
MINOR  IMPACT  THAT  IT  HAS  HAD  ON  OUR  SOCIAL 
AND  POLITICAL  STABILITY.  THIS  IS  IN  LARGE 
PART  DUE  TO  THE  FACT  THAT  OUR  SOCIAL  POLICIES 
AND  EXPENDITURES  HAVE  MITIGATED  THE  WORST 
HUMAN  EFFECTS  Of  THE  RECESSION,  ONE  WONDERS 
WHETHER  THOSE  WHO  URGE  US  TO  CUT  SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURES  AT  THIS  MOMENT  HAVE  FULLY 
CALCULATED  THE  RISKS  OF  SO  DOING, 
A FURTHER  POINT  THAT  CANNOT  BE  OVER-
I 
~,  ••  , 
~ ---·~. ·--· ~-·····- ·~'"-:··-·  '·· ~,.  .  ·~.-----· ...  .  ~  .  .  . 
,·  - .......  ---~-- ... ~--- -- .....  ·'- ·-: ···-- -·-
.-; ...... -.-.. .... ____  -·- :.-.. 
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-.  ___ :  .  ~:-..  :  ......  - ---
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. - ·-,· -- ··--...  - --:- ··,_  •.-:_·~  -· 
,.,_.  ___ -_-.---·,.  . -··. ···.; _, ... _  - .  - "·  .... 
..-.  ·-·  .-.  - .  ---· -·..  -
~-~~:~~_  .. ;,:_;~~~:~-r~-~s·:.:;~_:;.:~~~:--:r-:··!'":..:-_~:-~'-::~::·-:::.:~~:-·:.:-._~~;:.:v~~:;~;;~~~--- _._ ::·. 
. 
.-
LOOKED  IS  THE  CLOSE  LINK  BETWEEN  U.S,  ECONOMIC  :.c·.:,:  .. ;  ··'···'·:  ·  · 
AND  BUDGETARY  POLICY  AND  A POLICY  OF  INCREASED 
DEFENCE  EXPENDITURES,  THIS  TOO  IS  GOING  TO  BE 
A RECURRENT  THEME  IN  OUR  RELATIONShiP  OVER 
COMING  YEARS, 
THE  COMMUNITY  AS  SUCH1  OF  COURSE1  IS 
NOT  IN  ANY  WAY  INVOLVED  IN  DEFENCE  QUESTIONS, 
THAT  IS  A MATTER  THAT  IS  DEALT  WITH  PURELY  BY 
OUR  NATIONAL  GOVERNMENTS  AND  WITHIN  NATO, 
/· 
r 
\  ·- ,.. •. 
- ~.- . _,.: -:; ·: ... ,: '·'-... ·'· .. 
LET  ME1  HOWEVER  I  I  I  c  L  ;._,  ( 
-\ •'-·  .:-'- .,..  - .:  ' 
••  •  ,  ••  '  •  '  h  '.....  •  ~  •  •  '  -~-\; 
\ 
.  \ 
·\  ..  ~.  - . 
.  0  •  . 
.  . .  ..  ..  .  .  :..·:  --~·.  .  ~- .  .  ...... ·  .. 
..... - '·'  ..  -.. ·.  -· 
: ~- -'". -. 
.....  ,J .. 
- 15  -
LET  ME)  HOWEVER)  MAKE  A FEW  PERSONAL 
OBSERVATIONS  ON  THIS  QUESTION. 
IT  IS  QUITE  TRUE  THAT  THERE  IS  AN  • 
INTERNAL  DEBATE  IN  EUROPE  ON  DEFENCE  QUESTIONS, 
THIS  IS  HEALTHY·  AND  NATURAL, 
IF  DEFENCE  DECISIONS  ARE  TO  BE 
SUCCESSFULLY  IMPLEMENTED)  THEY  MUST  BE 
POLITICALLY  ACCEPTABLE,  THAT  MEANS  BUILDING 
A CONSENSUS  FOR  THEM;  AND)  TO  BUILD  A 
CONSENSUS  IN  A DEMOCRACY)  ALL  POINTS  OF  VIEW 
~YEN THOSE  OF  SO-CALLED  PACIFISTS  - MUST  BE 
EXPRESSED)  MUST  BE  LISTENED  TO  AND  MUST  BE 
.  . 
TAKEN  INTO  ACCOUNT  BEFORE  A DECISION  IS  TAKEN, 
.. 
THE  ··SAME  IS  TRUE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES,  ·.• 
THE  DIFFERENCE  IS  ONLY  BETWEEN  THE  SUBJECTS 
WITHIN  THE  DEFENCE  AREA  IN  WHICH  THERE  IS 
DEBATE.  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  THERE  IS  CON-
TROVERSY  OVER  THE  COST  AND  SITING  OF 
.: 
STRATEGI~. I! 
.  ·  ..  ,  /::·  • .......  <c  ....  : ...  ·.J  ............ ·.-··  :··.  ··-·  ..  ·'.  ·' 
.  .  ' 
·_._-,.. .  . . 
:  ;_  - . 
.  .  ...  -·._;_  '  ·: . .  _, ..  -.·· 
...  . . -..  ,-..... 
-- --
..  · ......  . 
.  \  . 
\ 
\ 
;.-,~;····  ~-::.,..::··:  .  . .  <:·< c~_-:·\:.;  :::..~:~.-:-': •  ·.-··-.:,;;.::.~--:-·.-;.· 
.:-:::-;·=~~~.;~::;::;:.,::~~-..:..;,;""":+-f:~:~:~-:-·.~~~~~  ~~~~- -~  ;:-'-':,_~·  ~;=--~-="}~_:.;-~~-,....,...  ~--"-=-----· 
::·~::.::·~~~~~-~:~:;'::~.:~····~·  -.•.•;•W;::--~·  ..  ~·  •  '::'  ~·: 
~~;;;~~:4.:·~  ..  .;~;;:~~--~-:(.::;~i;;~;;i,.;~..;;.t·~:,;.~~  .....  c..:'·-~.:~:-~.: .. :.:  "i·  ~--:.:.:,·,...  ···- •·  .  ---~.  -·-: _____ ....._  ~-·-.... ----J -.·  .. -.-::--·- ---.  . .... ~ ..  . 
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STRATEGIC  SYSTEMS,  IN  EUROPE  THESE  IS  SOME 
ARGUMENT  OVER  THE  DEPLOYMENT  OF  TACTICAL  NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS,  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  THE  QUESTION  OF 
THE  DRAFT  IS  ONE  THAT  ALMOST  NO  ONE  DARES  RAISE, 
.  - .  :  "~ :· :.:  ' ..  . .. . ... .  . 
IN  EUROPE ...  WHERE  WE  KNOW  WHAT  IT  IS  TO  HAVE  WAR  '"-~="""",:_,=:,.,~-:'-':'"~'~..-.:'~~"-'~""",.."'"i  .  .:._~:.~.:::~=-=-=-:~:  -
WAGED  ON  YOUR  OviN  TERRITORY.,  COMPULSORY  MILITARY.:~.---.  ·.\ 
SERVICE  IS  AN  ACCEPTED  FACT  IN  MOST  OF  OUR 
COUNTRIES 
IN  ADDITION ...  WE  DO  NOT  BELIEVE  IHAT 
DEFENCE  EXPENDITURES  SHOULD  BE  THE  SOLE  YARD-
STICK  BY  WHICH  WE  MEASURE  WHAT  EACH  IS  DOING 
TO  CONTRIBUTE  TO  GLOBAL  SECURITY  AND  STABILITY, 
-'-:·  -:. 
IN  THIS  CONTEXT.,  I  WOULD  CITE  TWO 
CASES  OF  WHAT  THE  COMMUNITY  IS  DOING;  CASES 
WHERE  WE  FEEL  THAT  OUR  POLICIES  ARE  ASSISTING 
- WIDEST  SENSE.  . . 
FIRST  THERE  IS  I  I,-
..  '.,  ·' 
;~-c.--:o-·  ··· ··-· - .·.  ·: .: - ~  ;,  :.~. · \;:::; :::.+.-::·--: .-7;:  .~.~--c-.c;;::.;:.~  -::-=-.:.::  · 
~-:;::: J~.~---·•: ~s~=;~~ ._:- >}:•·--··"-·  ·-
~::....:_~- ::.::~~:- ~: >::: ·: .... ~. :; :·:.::  ~-- ~  :. <-- ._  -.  't •. : :  ~~ .  ·:· ..... • ...... 
~-~~~---~~~;--..,·::.~2.::~~-~-;~;,:.i:~i:;~~;.:~··-~-..  :;:~~;;1; 7~-~-· .  .":,.>:  ···-- .: :'  ---.  - ---.---·------ ·- --------~--~':""-~  .. ---_ ......  --~ ...  -~ 
~~-*~s'g¥.;~~%J~~:~~~~;i.t~-9:e~L·~~~;.. 
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FIRST  THERE  IS  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE 
ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE  COMMUNITY, 
AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THIS  YEAR  GREECE 
BECAME  THE  COMMUNITY'S  TENTH  MEMBER,  IN  THE 
COURSE  OF  THE  NEXT  TWO  OR  THREE  YEARS,  WE 
SHALL  COMPLETE  ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  SPAIN  AND 
PORTUGAL  TO  JOIN  THE  COMMUNITY,  THE  DECISION 
TO  PRESS  AHEAD  WITH  THE.  ENLARGEMENT  OF  THE 
COMMUNITY  IS  ONE  THAT  WAS  TAKEN  FOR  POLITICAL 
~ 
RATHER  THAN  ECONOMIC  REASONS, 
IT  IS  A DECISION  THAT  WILL  PROVE 
ECONOMICALLY  EXPENSIVE  TO  US, 
EACH  OF  THESE  COUNTRIES  WAS  UNTIL 
RECENTLY  LIVIfl~-UNDER  SOME  FORM  OF  DICTATOR~  . 
SHIP,  ONCE  THEY  HAD  GOT  RID  OF  THEIR  . 
RESPECTIVE  DICTATORSHIPS,  ONE  DF  THE  FIRST 
THINGS  THAT  THEY  DID  WAS  TO  APPLY  TO  JOIN  THE 
COMMUNITX;  FOR  THE  SPECIFIC  POLITICAL  REASOJ~ 
THAT  THEY  WISHED,,  I 
.;:  .  -.- - r-·.  l  ~  ~ 
.;..~  # 
..  ·.;.:/ 
,···  ... 
~-,--
·- ..  ~-. 
~·  .  . .•·' ..  ~- ·: .  .  .. 
=t=~·::-.:r·_"..;_  .... ;;  ~.:::....:.· ..  ---:::·.-::...:.;:;.;.~----"";:""~~-·;;.;;~.  -~  ....  -:-.::"'":.--.-.  ~  ~  -.-.---
-~  ... ·-··::·- ..  - ... ~·;·-----. -- ·-~----·------ ... ---- -----·-
.  _:··  ~-....  ~~:: :·:_  .  .  .. .  .  . 
..  ..  .,....  ~,::.  ..... - ..  :· -:.. - .. ·· .. :~~--~_  .. ;  ::..  -... ·: -::>-:::·  :.~~-~-:~.:-:_.:f;::l .  -
:~t:-:.:\:.~L::~~;,,~;::;:;::~~;:;i:~:,:l·~~~;Z.£2~2(~:1:·~(  :-~::~~  LLt~_:~~-
.'"-:  .,,. ........  , ......  _ ...  _  -~-- ·.-~----.. ..,...-.  ·•·  -----.  ~-- ......  --- ----- -------
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THAT  THEY  WISHED  TO  BE  INCLUDED  IN  THIS 
DEMOCRATIC  FOLD,  TO  REINFORCE  THEIR  NEWLY-WON 
DEMOCRACY, 
AND  IT  WAS  FOR  THAT  REASON,  BECAUSE  OF 
THE  POLITICAL  RESPONSIBILITY  THAT  WE  FELT, 
THAT  WE  ACCEPTED  THEIR  APPLICATIONS  - IN  SPITE 
OF  THE  ECONOMIC  PROBLEMS  THAT  WE  KNEW  THIS 
WOULD  CAUSE I 
SECOND  AS  AN  EXAMPLE  OF  THE  CONTRIBU-
TION  WE  ARE  MAKING  TO  OVERALL  WESTERN  SECURITY, 
I  WOULD  MENTION  OUR  RELATIONS  WITH  THE 
--
STATES  NOW  GIVE  OVER  TWO  AND  HALF  TIMES  AS  MUCH 
AID  TO  THE  THIRD  WORLD  AS  DOES  THE  UNITED 
STATES, 
·-!  ..  , 
MOREOVER,  THE  WAYS  I~  WHICH  WE  ASSIST 
DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  THIRD  WORLD  GO  FAR  BEYOND 
A SIMPLE  TRANSFER  IN  THE  FORM  OF  LOANS  AND 
GRANTS  II  I 
.  ·~-·.  -
.. ·  ... ···  ... 
•'  . ... :, 
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GRANTS,  WHAT  WE  ARE  ESTABLISHING  IS  A SYSTEM 
OF  ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION  WITH  THE  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES. 
THERE  ARE  OBVIOUS  HUMANITARIAN  MOTIVES 
FOR  WHAT  WE  ARE  DOING,  WE  FEEL  A GENUINE 
RESPONSAB I LI TY  .FOR  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THESE 
COUNTRIES. 
AT  THE  SAME  TIME  THIS  IS  A POLICY  OF 
.  . , ' 
ENLIGHTENED  SELF-INTEREST,  THE  DEVELOPING 
WORLD  IS  AN  IMPORTANT  SOURCE  OF  RAW  MATERIALS 
TO  US  AND  A SIGNIFICANT  MARKET  FOR  OUR  OWN 
~~O~U:T3.  CUR  OWN  ECONO~IC  INTERESTS  PUSH  US 
IN  THE  DIRECTION  OF  DEVELOPING  RELATIONS  WITH 
THESE  COUNTRIES,  IN  THE  PROCESS  WE  CONTRIBUTE 
TO  THEIR  ECONOMIC  AND  THEREFORE  POLITICALJ 
STABILITY.  AT  THE  SAME  TIMEJ  WE  ARE  ABLE  TO 
-~- ~--
HELP  FURTHER  AND  PROMOTE  MORE  STABLE  POLITICAL  -
RELATIONS  BETWEEN  NORTH  AND  SOUTH, 
AS  EUROPE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  PURSUE 
THE  DISCUSSION  OVER  THE  JOINT-SHARING  OF  THE 
BURDENS  OF  OUR  COMMON  SECURITYJ  WE  FEEL  THAT 
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IHOSE  POINTS  SHOULD  BE  TAKEN  INTO  ACCOUNT. 
THE  COMMUNITY  IS  AN  IMPORTANT  PARTNER 
IN  THAT  DISCUSSION.  THE  FACT  THATJ  LIKE  THE 
POPEJ  WE  HAVE  NO  DIVISIONS  - NOT  EVEN  A SWISS 
GUARD  - DOES  NOT  MEAN  THAT  WE  PLAY  NO  ROLE 
IN  CONTRIBUTING  TO  OVERALL  SECURITY  INTERESTS, 
LET  ME  CONCLUDE  BY  COMING  BACK  TO 
WHAT  IS  NEVERTHELESS  THE  PRINCIPAL  ASPECT  OF 
BILATERAL  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  COMMUNITY  AND· 
THE  UNITED  STATES  - OUR  TRADE  RELATIONSHIP, 
THE  NEXT  FEW  YEARS  WILL  NOT  BE  EASY, 
~"---=.::.:::_:_ __  ____,._..:.:·-~-___.._. h;.-- --
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NONE  OF  THE  EFFORTS  BEING  MADE  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND  IN  EUROPE  TO  REVITALISE  OUR 
ECONOMIES  WILL  BE  OF  ANY  EFFECT  IF  WE  FALL  PREY  '·.  .  .  . 
TO  THE  TEMPTAJION  OF  PROTECTIONISM, 
WHILE  HIGH  LEVELS  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT 
PERSISTJ  WHILE  OUR  ECONOMIES  GROW  MARGINALLY, 
-:·-·.-.,·.-
IF  AT  ALLJ  THE  PRESSURE  FOR  PROTECTIONISM  WILL  ~~~~~~~~~~ 
GROW.!  I 
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GROW, 
I  HAVE  ALREADY  MENTIONED  THE  COM-
MUNITY's  DEFICITS  BOTH  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  JAPAN,  WE  ALL  KNOW  OF  THE  PROBLEMS  IN 
SENSITIVE  SECTORS  SUCH  AS  AUTOMOBILES)  STEEL 
AND  TEXTILES. 
THE  TEMPTATION  WILL  BE  TO  RESORT  TO 
ALLEDGEDLY  TEMPORARY  TRADE  RESTRICTIONS  IN  AN 
~ 
EFFORT  TO  SOLVE  SUCH  PROBL~MS,  WE  ALL  KNOW  OF 
THE  VARIOUS  MEANS  AVAILABLE  TO  LIMIT 
IMPORTS,  THE  WEAPONRY  OF  IMPEDIMENTS 
TO  TRADE  IS  HOUSED  IN  A WELL-STOCKED  ARSENAL, 
OUR  TRADE  DIFICITS  MAY  APPEAR  AT  TIMES 
TO  BE  GIGANTI~-~-AND  TO  WARRANT  THE  USE  OF  THIS  -:· 
ARMORY.  THIS  DOES  NOT  PER  SE  EITHER  JUSTIFY 
OR  EXCUSE  RESTRICTING  OR  HAMPERING  TRADE, 
..  r--- '-rEAD  TO  . I  I  .. 
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LEAD  TO  A SPIRALLING  SERIES  OF  RETALIATORY 
.  -~-.  . ...  '  .  .  .  . . .  . -
MEASURES  WHICH  COULD  ONLY  DO  DAMAGE  TO  THE  - ··-.· 
FABRIC  OF  THE  ECONOMY  OF  THE  WESTERN  WORLD, 
THE  TEMPTATION  TO  .RESORT  TO  PROTEC-
TIONISM  HAS  TO  BE  FIRMLY  RESISTED, 
IT  IS  THE  GREATEST  TRAP  INTO  WHICH 
WE  COULD  FALL,  IF  WE  CHOOSE  TO  SQUARE  OFF 
AGAINST  ONE  ANOTHER  AS  ECONOMIC  RIVALSJ  IT  IS 
HARD  TO  SEE  HOW  OUR  PARTNERSHIP  ON  ANY  OF  THE 
OTHER  COMMON  ISSUES  FACING  US  COULD  SURVIVE, 
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